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THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS
SUFFERING
I
By “ Vicarious Suffering ” is meant that the Bodhisattva 
wishes himself to suffer on behalf of sentient beings in order 
to save them. This idea of “vicarious suffering” is ex­
pressed in many canonical books, and the following quota­
tion is from the Avatamsaka-sutra, (Chinese translation by 
Sikshananda, Chap. X, on Parinamana):
‘ ‘ The Bodhisattva thinks thus: all sentient beings 
commit innumerable evil deeds, and on account of which 
they suffer innumerable sufferings, do not see the Tathagata, 
do not hear of the Good Law, do not recognise the pure 
Sangha. As they are loaded with innumerable evil deeds 
and their Karma, they are bound to suffer infinite pains. 
Therefore, I will stay for them in the evil paths and suffer 
their sufferings so that they may enjoy emancipation. I will 
never abandon them because of my incapacity of bearing 
all these “ vicarious sufferings ” which may cause my 
retrogression or fear or negligence. Because it is my desire 
to bear all sentient beings on my shoulders and to save 
them from such ills as birth, old age, sickness, and death, 
and to release them all from false philosophy, ignorance, and 
evils.................. ”
But in Buddhism the Bodhisattva seems to denote the 
historical Buddha Sakyamuni himself as he was intent on the 
attainment of Enlightenment. Bodhisattva literally means 
a being who aspires for Enlightenment, and the notion of 
Enlightenment is generally made to imply the salvation of 
sentient beings. Therefore, originally, Bodhisattva was the 
name given to fSakyamuni while he was still in his dis­
ciplinary stage before he became the Great Teacher of the 
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world. But the life of Sakyamuni while still in his 
disciplinary stage was not confined to this life only, but 
meant the many lives in the past which he spent practising 
all the virtues in order to save sentient beings. Hence the 
origination of the Jataka tales. In the Jataka tales we see 
many instances where he suffered for the sake of all sentient 
beings—not only human beings but all creatures endowed 
with life; thus he came to be saviour of the world as well 
as its teacher.
But in Mahayana Buddhism the name Bodhisattva is 
not confined to Sakyamuni in his disciplinary stage, but 
given to any one who is a true seeker of the Dharma, that 
is, who disciplines himself with the desire to benefit not 
only himself but others. Bodhisattvaship must then be 
considered consisting in the spirit of vicarious suffering. 
Now let us ask how we can take this vicarious suffering for 
the principle of Bodhisattvaship.
If pain is everywhere caused by an external cause, 
vicarious suffering may be to a certain extent possible, as 
we see in the story of Prince Zempuku, ’who suffered
the punishment in the place of the real culprit. The rich 
can taste the distress of the poor by giving up all their 
property. To give a part of one’s skin or blood to others 
who need them for some medical purposes may be said to 
be a case of vicarious suffering.
But these things are practised in some extreme cases not 
commonly met with in our ordinary life, and it is naturally 
impossible to practise this kind of things for all our fellow­
beings. Vicarious suffering 'will be altogether impossible (it 
seems to me) when pain is produced entirely by an interior 
cause: the pain of old age, the pain of an incurable 
disease,—who could suffer this for the actual sufferer ? This
1 Sikshananda’s translation, Chapter on “ Entrance into the Dhar- 
madhatu.”
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impossibility will become all the graver when pain comes 
from the inmost recesses of conscience which grieves not 
over the consequence of evil deeds but over the fact of their 
at all being committed; that is to say, the more inner the seat 
of pain, the more impossible its vicarious suffering will be.
Even when this vicarious suffering is confined to the 
person of Sakyamuni who is said to have gone through a 
life of sacrifice, the problem remains unsolved as long as 
we are on the plane of common sense. One may say this 
is a matter of religious faith. If so, how can we have this 
justified in our religious experience ?
II
To inquire into this problem I will take as the basis of 
my study Genju’s (Ml?) noted commentary on the Kegon 
(Avatamsaka Sutra) and that by Ohokwan in which
various opinions are enumerated concerning the doctrine of 
vicarious suffering. In these enumerations no particular 
interpretations of the doctrine are offered, but they are rich 
in suggestion.
According to Genju and Ohokwan, vicarious suffering 
is desired by the Bodhisattva. In Maitreya’s treatise on 
Yogacara philosophy we read: the Bodhisattva with his 
excellent wisdom and deeds accumulates the pabulum necessary 
for his Enlightenment and has no other thoughts but pity 
and sympathy with all suffering beings. He vows to be in 
the evil paths in order to save suffering beings therein: 
fixing his abode in these evil paths he stays there and 
attains Enlightenment. He vows again to bear on himself 
the outcome of all the evil deeds committed by them in 
order to save them from sufferings. He wishes to atone for 
their evil Karma. The idea is through this vow not to let 
all suffering beings be actual sufferers of their own evil 
Karma, but to let them enjoy only the result of their good 
Karma. The Bodhisattva has destroyed all the seeds of 
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passions and gone beyond, all the evil paths. According to 
this, it is evident that to suffer pain for others is the vow 
of the Bodhisattva.
Genju and Chokwan seem to regard the vow as a fact 
of experience actually gone through by the Bodhisattva 
himself, and they are inclined to understand Maitreya in a 
somewhat superficial manner. But as we know that the 
doctrine advanced in the treatise on Yogacara is represen­
tative of the views held by the Indian Buddhist philosopher, 
due respect is to be paid to it, and I wish to elucidate first 
of all what is meant by the vow (pranidhand). We already 
know in the Avatamsaka-sutra that vicarious suffering is 
vowed by the Bodhisattva: what is this vow, generally 
speaking ? What does it mean to save all sentient beings 
through this vow ? When this question is made clear, we 
may perhaps understand what is really meant by vicarious 
suffering.
The term Bodhisattva means the one who seeks for 
Enlightenment. Enlightenment is the ideal of Bodhisattva­
hood and original reason of his being. Therefore, the vow 
of the Bodhisattva is to realise the original reason of 
himself, that is, unfold the Buddha-nature in himself. But 
how does he realise it with the consciousness that it is for 
his own benefit ? As long as we are conscious of the fact 
that anything is done for the sake of self, in whatever 
sense this may be understood, there is no way for us to 
escape the bondage of this self. In order to realise the 
Original Self it is necessary to deny the notion that it is 
for one’s self. What takes place in our consciousness in 
the denial of self is no other than the notion that it is for 
all suffering beings. The realisation of the Original Self 
may thus be possible only when the narrower self is given 
up and replaced by the notion of all sentient beings. 
Accordingly, the vow to save all suffering beings means 
truly to attain Enlightenment.
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The idea advanced in the treatise on this interpretation 
will grow clearer, when we know that the original reason 
of Selfhood is Enlightenment which is the awakening of the 
transcendental self, while what it actually experiences in this 
world of senses constitutes this world of suffering beings. 
Therefore, the salvation of all suffering beings must come 
from the eternal vow of the Bodhisattva, and this vow is 
expressed in his deep feeling towards all sentient beings for 
whom he desires to suffer vicariously. This is truly the 
vow of the Bodhisattva, and that it shows no retrogression 
in its intensity is the very condition of its fulfillment. 
Therefore, the Bodhisattva entertaining the vow destroys as 
the first thing all the seeds of passions in himself and goes 
beyond all the evil paths; it is not thus quite fair to 
consider his vow a merely idealistic vow which is fine in 
sentiment but in fact utterly ineffective because suffering 
beings actually suffer. For as long as the Bodhisattva, 
through his vow, personally expresses all the sufferings in 
this world of the senses, he is, in the most realistic sense 
of the word, vicariously suffering for all sentient beings.
This is evident from those passages in the Avatamsaka- 
sutra, to which reference has already been made. In them 
the reasons are enumerated why the Bodhisattva desires to 
be the saviour of all beings, and from them wTe also learn 
that his heart of deep compassion never shows retrogression 
in the face of every possible harm and enmity. His large 
heart is there likened to the sun that does not refuse to 
shine because of the presence of the blind; the sutra then 
goes on to speak about the Bodhisattva’s desire to suffer for 
others, and his irrevocable determination that ‘ ‘ Even when 
I am all alone in this resolution I will not falter.” Accord­
ing to these statements in the sutra, it appears that from 
the desire for Enlightenment there issues the vow to save 
all beings; while the latter are not actually and perceptibly 
benefitted by the ardent desire of the Bodhisattva to save
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them, the Bodhisattva never ceases to wish eternally for the 
benefit of all sentient beings; this is due to the fact that 
Enlightenment is essentially and ultimately for all beings 
and not for oneself. Therefore, in spite of the fact that 
beings to be saved are immeasurable in number, the Bo­
dhisattva, ever intent on saving his fellow-beings, perfects, 
innerly in himself, through his vow and virtue, his own 
being. In other words, while always suffering for others 
the Bodhisattva realises his Original Self.
Thus we are able to understand the meaning of the 
truth constantly reiterated in the sutra, that the Bodhisattva, 
while all the time desiring to save all beings infinite in 
number, fufills his vow and attains his Buddhahood even 
before all suffering beings are actually saved. This appears 
to our common-sense view quite self-contradictory. When, 
however, the Bodhisattva realises the eternal nature of his 
vow, he realises at the same time that Enlightenment is 
the ultimate end of the vow as well as its own reason; 
hence the fulfillment of the vow means no other than 
penetratingly understanding the inmost meaning of the vow 
itself.
Ill
Even when vicarious suffering is regarded as the essential 
intent of the vow of the Bodhisattva, is it possible from the 
practical standpoint of view for him to say that he vicariously 
suffers for others if the latter are not thereby benefitted in 
any demonstrable manner ? That is to say, the idea of 
vicarious suffering must have two factors: the consciousness 
of suffering in the one who vicariously suffers arid the 
acknowledgment of the fact by the one whose suffering is 
vicariously suffered by the former. It goes without saying 
that the fact of vicarious suffering has nothing to do with 
its acknowledgment on the part of the vicariously suffered; 
but there must be some meaning in deeds of vicarious
THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS SUFFERING 151 
suffering, which is to be acknowledged by the vicariously 
suffered in their inmost hearts.
As long as the vow of vicarious suffering leads to deeds, 
the latter are as a matter of fact to be recognised by those 
whose suffering is vicariously suffered. A deed, however 
great and far-reaching it may be in its influence on society, 
is not to be considered representative if the motive, that is, 
the vow is not real and sincere; on the contrary, a deed 
may not be one of great outward consequence, but if the 
motive is true and sincere it is the one that is to be thanked 
for by all people. Therefore, every true and sincere deed must 
be recognised as containing in itself something representative, 
and through this medium we find our way of salvation for 
ourselves. So we read in Chokwan’s Commentary: “When 
the Bodhisattva disciplines himself in asceticism in order to 
seek the Dharma for the benefit of all beings, this we have 
called ‘vicarious.’ This practice later becomes an ever- 
excellent guidance for all beings, as they strive after 
Enlightenment, and in this sense also the Bodhisattva may 
be said to ‘ vicariously suffer ’ for others. When we read 
the lives of self-sacrificing Buddhists who perseveringly 
sought after the path in the face of every possible hardship, 
we unfailingly feel that their heroic deeds were meant for 
us, and that but for their efforts how little should we know 
now of the meaning of our own lives ? ’ ’
Vicarious sufferers are not necessarily limited to such 
personalities as are known as saintly or worthy. When our 
spiritual eye opens we shall be able to discover those worthy 
sufferers everywhere; they are not to be limited to a few 
historical figures. The question will then turn on the 
presence of the spiritual eye which detects our vicarious 
sufferers. The detection is possible only when our spiritual 
eye partakes the same nature as that which constitutes the 
fundamental spirit of the vicarious sufferer himself. And as 
we can conceive this perceiving eye as a reflection of the 
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pure spirit of the vicarious sufferer we may conclude that to 
recognise the virtue of the vicarious sufferer is in itself due 
to the action of this virtue. Then what is the deed of 
vicarious suffering ?
IV
As long as deeds issue from the vow, what is the most 
essential is naturally the vow itself and not deeds. But it 
is also important to investigate into the several forms the 
deeds assume. We see a sort of answer to the question in 
the Commentaries on the Avatamsalca-sutra by Genju and 
Chokwan.
One of the forms assumed by deeds of vicarious 
suffering is sympathetic cooperation. This mean “ living in 
the same way.” Now to save others, one is naturally 
expected to surpass them in wisdom and virtue, for it is a 
good swimmer that can save the drowning. But the saver, 
in order to save the drowning, must throw himself into the 
rapids and fight with the waves. Therefore, an excellent 
saviour of mankind must have within himself a world which 
is not of this world though in his outward life living the 
life of a mortal being which does not differ from that which 
is lived by his fellow-creatures. By thus transcending the 
world the saviour has in himself something not bound by 
pleasure and pain, but by thus conforming himself to the 
world he is capable of suffering pleasure and pain. If this 
apparent contradiction is not permitted, it will be impossible 
for the vicarious sufferer to save others. Then, in what 
sense is this ‘ ‘ transcending and conforming ’ ’ possible ?
To transcend the world means inwardly to abandon all 
passion, that is, to be delivered from all desires and thoughts, 
whereas to conform to the world means to have various 
passions and not to be delivered from desires and thoughts. 
Thus to conform while transcending means not to abandon 
passions unnaturally, and to transcend while conforming
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means in no time to be controlled by passions. Hence the 
doctrine of “intentional retention of passions.” It means 
that the Bodhisattva retains passions and not purposely 
annihilates them in order to conform to the ordinary life of 
the world. The vow of salvation which has the Bodhi as 
its basis is infinite, and as our actual life evolves with 
nothing to hinder its course, passions are stirred without a 
moment’s stoppage. But from the Bodhi which is the 
foundation of humanity issues wisdom whereby all these 
passions and worldly turmoils are kept under control. There­
fore, passions are absorbed in the Bodhi just as they are 
and digested therein making the latter ever richer. We 
read in Asanga’s Mahdyana-Samgraha-Sastra (Chinese trans­
lation) :
“ All passions have already been subjugated:
As poison by itself loses its own poisonous nature,
So ignorance is exhausted by its very ignorance;
And the Buddha attains his all-knowledge.
All confused thoughts become factors of Enlightenment,
And Birth-and-Death (samsara) turns into Nirvana;
The Buddha who accomplishes the great skilful means of 
salvation (upaya),
He is indeed beyond comprehension.”
This doctrine of ‘ ‘ intentional retention of passions ’ ’ may 
sound strange when we understand it as meaning that when 
one is left to oneself no passions arise but they are needed 
for the benefit of others; for this is a sort of self-justification. 
If the doctrine is understood in this way, that is, while 
morality based on utilitarian principles is not good, the 
total absence of practical consideration may cause the motive 
of doing anything good to wither away, and for this reason 
the Bodhisattva retains all his passions—if the doctrine is 
to be understood thus, it will greatly lose in its spiritual 
signification. The essence of the doctrine, as I take it, lies 
in the ultimate control of passions by means of wisdom.
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Desires and passions are, so to speak, raw materials of life 
which are purified by wisdom. No one can exterminate his 
desires and passions. The wise will not be led astray by 
them, keeping them always under control. They will thereby 
enrich the content of their experiences. As long as they 
have desires and passion they will have to suffer sufferings 
inherent to life. When sufferings are purified by wisdom, 
they not only become their own spiritual possession but are 
offerings to all humankind. Those to whom we pay our 
homage as the spiritual representatives of all sentient beings 
were not exempt from bitter experiences of life, but in them 
all the sufferings and tribulations were purified through true 
wisdom.
Genju and Chokwan recite the following cases as deeds 
of vicarious suffering, which are however quite problematical. 
The first one may be termed 1 ‘ intentional commitment of 
evils.” The Bodhisattva purposely commits crimes in order 
to attain a certain object, and the consequence of it he is 
made to suffer; in other words, he commits an evil deed to 
fulfil his vow of salvation preparing himself for its bitter 
retribution. If this is morally permissible, it comes to this 
that evil deeds are morally justified for the realisation of a 
lofty enhanced ideal as long as one is ready to suffer penalty 
as the outcome of his evil deed.
Shuncho, a devotee of the Pundanka, is said to have 
been often in prison on the charge of slight crimes, the 
idea was to approach the jail-birds and save them from 
spiritual suffering. It is reported that an Indian Buddhist 
philosopher justified murder for the love of the murdered. 
And in this case the Bodhisattva would go to hell in a 
most exalted state of mind. He maintains that such deeds 
are to be recognised as those of the Bodhisattva inasmuch 
as a victim of his purposeful crime is thereby relieved of 
his own suffering due to his past Karma.
If such substitution is possible and is acknowledged as
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Bodhisattvaic morality here we have an adequate example 
of vicarious suffering. But we feel that the problem is 
highly pregnant of grave consequences. We can say that, 
strictly considered, the deliberate commitment of evil deeds 
is an impossibility. True morality is to be regulated accord­
ing to ideas universally acceptable and cannot be specified 
by any definitely itemised clauses of morality. For this 
reason, unwritten laws of morality are variously applicable 
according to time and situation. Or the specified items of 
morality may be idealised so as to mean that the killing of 
the body is compatible with the saving of the soul. There­
fore, if the Bodhisattva is really awakened to the true ideals 
of humanity, whatever deeds he commits cannot be designated 
as evil. Consequently, in whatever way the Bodhisattva may 
act, no retribution can ever be his lot just as a good physician 
never suffers pain on account of the operation he may 
perform on his patient.
But the question is more concrete and realistic. What 
should the Bodhisattva do if the view which he conceives 
true is unfortunately against common sense and the tradition 
of his time ? In point of fact, such disagreements are 
rather a matter of common occurrence. In this case the 
Bodhisattva, as the representative of his time and society, 
must hold himself also responsible for evils of his own 
time. But this is the negative phase of his moral conscious­
ness; though it is of more significance than is ordinarily 
imagined, requiring more serious considerations. Still he is 
required to make some positive assertion that may seem on 
the surface to contradict the so-called common-sense view of 
things as well as the tradition of his time. And in this 
case he is naturally expected to suffer all the bitter con­
sequences of his deeds; for were they not crucified by their 
contemporaries,—they who rendered great real services to 
humanity ?
As is seen here, what is considered an evil deed is not 
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necessarily evil in the moral consciousness of the Bodhisattva 
himself, being only so when judged by the moral standard 
of the time. To judge however the conduct of the Bodhi­
sattva, we must resort to the absolute standard of morality 
and not in its accidental relations to the views cherished by 
his contemporaries. Behind his positive conduct thus wTe 
can see his self-sacrificing spirit with which he is willing to 
bear on himself all the ills of his time.
The last form of vicarious suffering we may mention, 
is the self-sacrificing deeds of the Bodhisattva, by which he 
is himself willing to offer his own life, for the execution of 
anything that is needful for humanity, regardless of personal 
hardships and dangers. The welfare and progress of society 
owes a great deal to the conduct of the masses whose merits 
are usually unrecorded in all history. If the farmer entirely 
gives up his profession what should become of us? All 
kinds of labourers form the foundation of society. However 
maginificent a mansion may be, it cannot retain its splendour 
if no drudges are available for keeping the establishment in 
good and clean and sanitary conditions. The smooth work­
ing and orderliness of social life will at once be put out of 
gear if every woman wants to be a lady and every man to 
be a gentleman of leisure. We know that the stage is not 
set up for the sake of a curtain-raiser and a utility-man, 
but without them we cannot have any sort of play. For 
that very reason, however, there are very few persons who 
are willing to be curtain-raisers or general utility-men. 
Therefore, those who perform such parts may regarded as 
placed on the sacrificial altar when they are evaluated from 
the general economy of the stage. Fully recognising the 
importance of such parts and yet not unconscious of public 
frigidity, the Bodhisattva offers himself to perform all the 
ignominous functions in the orderly evolution of the great 
drama which is known as human life. The original vow of 
Kshitigarbha and the universal manifestation of Avalokites-
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vara exemplify in the most familiar manner cases of 
vicarious suffering.
We all know that hidden conduct is the basis of any 
successful achievement. In all departments of human activity 
anything worth reputation is preceded by many hard ex­
periences. Social morality is sustained by silent workers who 
go their own way not demanding wealth or fame as reward. 
There is no enterprise that does not require perseverance 
and silent suffering on the part of the workers. Therefore, 
generally speaking, no work can be accomplished without 
the spirit of self-sacrifice. Further, when one realises that 
the basis of any undertaking is laid in self-sacrificial conduct, 
the worker must be free from the consciousness that he is 
doing self-sacrificing work.
V
By the foregoing explanation we have come to under­
stand what are some of the forms of vicarious suffering; 
showing that importance is to be attached more to the motive 
or vow (pranidhcina) which is the basis of conduct, than to 
conduct itself. That is to say, men of vicarious suffering to 
whom we feel greatly indebted, realise the vow in their 
conduct. From this point of view’, whatever conduct it may 
be, as far as it issues from a true sincere vow, it must be 
regarded as a form of vicarious suffering. While human 
conduct in general may be regarded in the light of vicarious 
suffering, it does not follow that the general mass of people 
are all Bodhisattvas of that order. Very few of them are 
worthy of our respect and reverence as self-sacrificing and 
vicariously suffering Bodhisattvas. Most people are just 
living under the stimulation of personal desires. That is, few 
in number are real Bodhisattvas and many indeed those who are 
to be saved by them. When the matter is critically examined 
vicarious sufferers grow less and less in number until we 
know two or three really such in the whole history of mankind.
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If so, is the ideal Bodhisattva so rare as we have to 
consider him an impossible specimen of humanity ? The 
thing is, however, to turn this critical way of judging 
human conduct and direct it on ourselves and not on a 
generality of people moving towards the gratification of their 
own egotistic passions. So when we critisise others we • are 
really critisising ourselves. To declare that there is no spirit 
of vicarious suffering in the world is to confess that we have 
no such spirit within our own hearts. The criticism must 
be directed on ourselves. It must be self-reflection. Now 
let us ask whence this self-reflection comes. It is no other 
than the working of the Bodhi which makes the Bodhisattva 
vow to save all sentient beings. The subject of self-reflection 
is the Bodhisattva and its object is all beings. While in 
this concrete self itself wre may naturally find the unity of 
subject and object, in our empirical consciousness the “I ” 
as an objective existence is entirely individualistic. Some 
may think that even this “ I ” may not be lacking in the 
spirit of vicarious suffering; but here we find that the light 
of self-reflection has not yet penetrated deep enough into the 
recesses of consciousness where there lurks a trace of self- 
conceit which is really self-deception. The genuineness of 
the spirit is no longer there. However, if there is no 
Bodhisattva’s vow lying perhaps still dormant deep in our 
hearts and not yet recognised by our self-reflecting conscious­
ness, we shall have no occasion to lament our personal 
defects, nor may we be able to discover any vicarious 
sufferers however scarce they may come to us.
At the same time, the more this will become clear in 
our practical reason, the more will be the number of vicari­
ous sufferers acknowledged as such until we come to recognise 
the meaning of vicarious suffering in the whole body of 
humanity. In other words, our self-criticism wonderfully 
makes it clear that all sentient beings are to be saved as 
well as ourselves, and also that the Bodhisattva of vicarious
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suffering is the taproot of their existence. However few may 
be exemplars of vicarious suffering, that which makes up 
the essence of vicarious suffering is no other than the 
apriori-s&li of all sentient beings. It is for the maturest 
realisation of this apriori-self in the vicarious sufferers that 
we especially admire and respect; that is to say, that which 
we worship in all wise and holy beings is found reflected in 
our own souls while what constitutes our opriori-self is found 
realised in the Bodhisattva. This is the reason why in 
Buddhism the historical Buddha Soakyamuni is not recognised 
as the vicarious sufferer. All the innumerable Bodhisattvas 
referred to in the sutras are the ideal of all sentient beings 
that makes up their transcendental-ego. The names of the 
Bodhisattvas mean various desires and hopes of humanity. 
The name Samantabhadra in the Avatamsaka-sutra represents 
the virtue of the Bodhisattva in general, and Dharmakara- 
Bhikshu in the Sukliavativyuha-sutra means the most funda­
mental unity of all Bodhisattvas. As to the number of 
Bodhisattvas, whether one or many, it is not to be 
predetermined. As far as each living individual is expression 
of a desire, or hope, or will, there must be so many 
corresponding Bodhisattvas, but when all those desires or 
hopes are regarded as unified in one fundamental will there 
is but one Bodhisattva. When we thus understand the 
meaning of Bodhisattvahood, we are also able to comprehend 
the meaning of vicarious suffering.
We have understood the term “vicarious ” in the sense 
of “representative.” Of course these two concepts are to be 
distinguished the one from the other. As we recognise a 
deep meaning in the various stories of vicarious suffering as 
told in the Jataka-tales, the former is not to be confused 
with the latter. If a man acts for others with the heart of 
a Bodhisattva, we can read here his desire to save all sentient 
beings. This is what we may call a “representative deed.” 
So, the essential meaning of “vicarious suffering” must be 
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sought in the idea of its being representative for all beings 
so as to bear their evil Karma for them. And the real 
vicarious sufferer in this empirical life is no other than our 
transcendental ego itself, which constitutes the “ not-I ” in 
me.
Now we come to understand the explanation given by 
Genju and Chokwan that “ Samantabhadra makes the 
spiritual universe his own body, which is constituted by all 
sentient beings; thus Samantabhadra is always the sufferer 
for all sentient beings, and in this sense his suffering is 
called ‘vicarious.’” What is the most direct sufferer in 
this vicarious suffering is not what we understand by 
“ others,” nor is it sentient beings themselves; it is Saman­
tabhadra himself who suffers vicariously in sentient beings. 
In other words, when we are awakened to the sufferings we 
are actually experiencing and bear them, this is said to 
suffer spiritually aided by Samantabhadra, for we by our­
selves have no power of enduring sufferings. Forgetting 
Samantabhadra, however, who wants to suffer vicariously for 
us to an infinite degree, we externally seek for the means 
of removing our sufferings.
But to seek for the vicarious sufferer too near ourselves 
may seem to disregard the true sense of “ vicarious suffer­
ing”; for each individual is a complete being by himself. 
In this case, that there is something still not quite clear in 
the meaning of ‘ ‘ vicarious suffering ’ ’ is because one under­
stands it in the sense of “substitution”: when it is 
understood in the sense of “representative” the idea grows 
more intelligible, because the vicarious sufferer is near 
enough to us and in this again we are able to see such a 
vicarious sufferer in others. In those whom we esteem as 
vicarious sufferers there is no need to cherish the con­
sciousness that they suffer for others. We see that the true 
vicarious sufferers have not such a self-conceit and move 
according to the vow and conduct of Samantabhadra. And
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we may take part in the great and sacred movement by 
aspiring for the deed and the vow of Samantabhadra. 
Herein we must seek for Life and Light Eternal.
Taiye Kaneko
